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Abstract I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that
anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and
cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also
show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
Keywords Value of knowledge  Knowledge  Position to know  Dispositional
belief  Memory
1 Introduction
In the Meno Plato tries to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true
belief. Philosophers for some while have generally agreed that there is something
here to explain. There is more recent agreement on something stronger: not just
mere true belief, but anything falling short of knowledge is less valuable.1 The value
of knowledge is distinctive. I briefly go over evidence for this more recent view,
then I introduce and defend an argument against. Finally, I extend the argument,
concluding that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively
valuable. Throughout the discussion I remain neutral on exactly what is allegedly
distinctive about the value of knowledge. Maybe it’s the degree of value, maybe it’s
the kind of value. I am silent even about the general variety of value at issue. Often
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philosophers contrast it with practical value and refer to it as epistemic value, but
that illuminates less than one might think. It’s similar to referring to the
congressional value of congress or the feline value of cats.
2 Knowledge acknowledged
On a standard account, knowledge is justified true belief plus something that rules
out Gettier cases, cases in which it is only accidental that believing with justification
leads to truth. If knowledge is distinctively valuable, it has a value that it doesn’t
merely inherit from some subset of its proper parts. Anything that ‘‘falls short’’ of
knowledge—such as belief, true belief, justified belief, and so on—falls short in
value too. Allegedly, this leads to a problem. Pritchard (2007: 87) calls it the
secondary value problem: the problem of explaining why knowledge has this value.
The view that knowledge is distinctively valuable seems true, yet it allegedly isn’t
clear enough why the view is true. Still, many philosophers treat it as a default
view.2
Jonathan Kvanvig is one of the few philosophers to comment on why there even
seems to be a secondary value problem. Kvanvig (2009: 345) says that knowledge-
ascriptions legitimately close inquiry, while ascriptions of things that fall short of
knowledge do not:
It is banal to remark that Bo believes something that he ought to investigate
further, or even that Joe ought to investigate further even though his believing
is correct, a display of cognitive excellence, and justified or rational. Things
are different, however, when we utter the perplexing ‘Bo knows…but ought to
check further.’
Hence, to Kvanvig (2009: 344) knowledge seems ‘‘ordinarily thought of, or
assumed, to be more valuable than its proper subparts.’’ And, he (2009: 346) adds, if
there were no such general assumption, then ‘‘the focus in the history of
epistemology on the nature and extent of knowledge would be downright
indefensible.’’ The history of epistemology, charitably interpreted, assumes as a
‘‘working hypothesis’’ that knowledge is distinctively valuable. Ultimately, Kvanvig
rejects the assumption. But he still thinks it starts out with a default status.
Carter et al. (2013: 3716 n. 2) think a simple thought experiment, which they
attribute to Pritchard, generates the ‘‘insight’’ that knowledge has ‘‘special epistemic
value’’. The thought experiment: if offered possession of either knowledge or mere
true belief, knowledge seems preferable. Presumably, they mean to add that
knowledge also seems preferable to anything else falling short of it, and that
2 When BonJour (2010: 58–61) for example attacks fallibilism, he crucially and without explanation
assumes knowledge is the ‘‘epistemic summum bonum.’’ Anything short of it lacks its value. And, for
example, when Pritchard (2007: 87) originally names the secondary value problem, he just takes it as a
given that there is a problem here to solve. For other value problems concerning knowledge, see Pritchard
(2007).
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preferences here reveal value differences. So, knowledge seems distinctively
valuable.
There are of course many partial, potential explanations of knowledge’s value.
Perhaps, for example, knowledge is a kind of norm (e.g., of assertion, belief, action,
or practical reasoning), or perhaps the true analysis of knowledge displays its worth.
But by itself, this isn’t evidence that knowledge is distinctively valuable. Some
things falling short of knowledge could have competing virtues, such that they share
its value. So, we should not assume that a given normative status or analysis of
knowledge by itself explains why there is a secondary value problem.
3 Knowledge depreciated
I will develop an argument against the distinctive value of knowledge. Support for
the argument also reveals that the evidence for knowledge’s distinctive value is
misleading. As noted earlier, knowledge has epistemic components, a truth
component, and a psychological component. Now, even Kvanvig (2003) and
Pritchard (2010), who deny that knowledge is distinctively valuable, still think
knowledge in part derives whatever value it has from its psychological component.
I propose, however, that knowledge derives its value from its epistemic and truth
components. Eliminate its psychological component, and the value needn’t
diminish. In particular, I claim that the relation of being in a position to know
can share the value of knowledge, but being in a position to know doesn’t involve
belief. So the value of knowledge isn’t distinct.
My argument, more precisely, is:
P1. Not all dispositional knowledge that p is distinct in value from being in a
position to know that p.
P2. If not all dispositional knowledge that p is distinct in value from being in a
position to know that p, then knowledge is not distinctively valuable.
C. Knowledge is not distinctively valuable.
To clarify: an occurrent mental state is a mental state that is in some way before the
mind, making a difference to consciousness. A merely dispositional mental state is
not before the mind. It is ‘‘stored’’ or ‘‘non-occurrent’’, absent from consciousness.
It is commonsensical to think that, a moment ago, you believed that Plato taught
Aristotle. If you had the belief, it was dispositional. Now that you’re reflecting on it
and its content, it’s occurrent. Traditionally, knowledge is not thought to be a mental
state, but rather a relation between mind and world.3 Still, knowledge inherits
dispositional or occurrent status just when its mental state component—belief—is
dispositional or occurrent. S’s knowledge that p is dispositional only if S’s belief
that p is dispositional. S’s knowledge that p is occurrent only if S’s belief that p is
occurrent. Knowledge has dispositional and occurrent modes.
3 For famous rejection of this traditional view, see Williamson (2000: Chap. 1).
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A little-explored relation that falls short of knowing is being in a position to
know. Three points about this relation are generally accepted.4 First, if S is in a
position to know that p, then p is true. Second, if S is in a position to know that p,
then there is no epistemic ‘‘obstacle’’ to S’s knowing that p. This could mean, for
example, that S’s justification is strong enough for S to know that p, and that it
would not be accidental if S’s believing on this justification led to truth. Third, being
in a position to know that p does not require believing that p. Since knowledge
requires belief, being in a position to know is not itself a kind of knowing. When in
a position to know, you are all set to know. If you would just believe that p (on your
justification), then you’d know that p.5
P1 states that there is a mode of knowledge—namely, dispositional knowledge—
which sometimes shares all value with something besides knowledge—namely,
being in a position to know. I will offer two lines of support for P1. The first centers
on the fact that, in some cases, only something trivial distinguishes being in a
position to know from dispositionally knowing. Consider two subjects, Al and Bill,
who are maximally similar, but with this difference: currently Al almost believes
that p, but does not believe that p; and Bill believes that p, dispositionally. Al fails to
satisfy some necessary condition for dispositionally believing that p. It’s not clear
what all these necessary conditions are. Perhaps, in order for a subject to
dispositionally believe that p, the subject must have occurrently believed that p at
some point.6 If so, Al and Bill are as follows. Al has satisfied all requirements for
4 See Conee (2005: 449), David and Warfield (2008: 170–1), Fantl and McGrath (2009: 84), and
Williamson (2000: 95, 174 n. 3).
5 A referee suggests that my slogan here is threatened by a kind of case Kvanvig (2014: 188) discusses,
where forming a belief will eliminate one’s evidence for it. You might be in a position to know that
you’ve never considered q. But if you form the belief that you’ve never considered q, you’ll thereby
consider q, eliminating your evidence for the belief. I think this sort of case interestingly reveals that there
are propositions one can be in a position to know, but cannot know. Knowledge requires belief and
justification, and in these cases forming belief eliminates justification. Still, I think my conditional about
being in a position to know holds: if you would just believe that p (on your justification), then you’d know
that p. The cases in question are simply ones where the conditional’s antecedent cannot be satisfied. Since
the belief would eliminate its justification, it cannot be formed on its justification. I thank the referee for
encouraging reflection here.
Williamson (2000: 95) would strike the parenthetical from my conditional: ‘‘If one is in a position to
know, and one has done what one is in a position to do to decide whether p is true, then one does know
p.’’ Unfortunately, this attributes knowledge in cases where one ultimately ‘‘decides’’ based on mere
desire, bias, fear, etc.
Being in a position to know and dispositional belief have knotted connections with tacit belief, inactive
belief, implicit belief, and a disposition to believe. This isn’t the place to unravel the knots.
6 Cf. Bergmann (2005: 421), Huemer (1999: 356 n. 15) and Moser (1989: Chap. 1). One might deny that
dispositional belief requires this. An ordinary subject may have never occurrently believed that she was
born after her grandfather. Nonetheless, it seems plausible that she dispositionally believes it. However, it
may be more plausible that the subject simply has a disposition to believe she was born after her
grandfather—she is all set to believe it—and, strictly speaking, does not yet dispositionally believe it.
This option is attractive in part because it prevents an explosion of beliefs. It prevents the ordinary, finite-
in-mind subject from counting as believing indefinitely many propositions, such as that she was born after
her grandfather had been alive for a minute, that she was born after her grandfather had been alive for a
half a minute, that she was born after her grandfather had been alive for a quarter of a minute, etc.
Still, suppose dispositional belief does not require prior occurrent belief. Exactly what does it require,
then? The complete answer is far from clear. As a result, there will be cases where something counts as
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dispositionally believing p, except for having at some point occurrently believed
that p. Bill indeed occurrently believed that p in the past. Bill’s belief that p is
currently dispositional.
Here is one of many suitable ways of making the difference between Al and Bill
concrete. Cognitive psychological research reveals that memory processing involves
significant gist extraction.7 After specific experiential information enters memory
processing, its gist is often combined with other information already in memory.
This combined information is stored, and the more specific information that entered
is often just dumped. The subject may have never occurrently believed the gist. She
may have just believed the more specific information. Suppose, then, that Al and
Bill looked over a list of names: Anscombe, Berkeley, Chisholm, and so on. When
going over the list, Al did not occurrently believe that p: it is a list of philosophers’
names. But Bill did occurrently believe that p. Due to normally-functioning memory
processing, Bill eventually stores something like that information, and (via gist
extraction) so does Al. Each is such that, if he eventually activated that information,
p would not only seem true but also familiar and already accepted. Each would
occurrently believe that p upon activating the stored information, and it wouldn’t
seem to either as if he is just then learning that p.
Whether p counts as dispositionally believed right now ultimately depends on
whether it was occurrently believed earlier. Due to their slightly different
psychological histories, Bill currently dispositionally believes that p, but Al does
not. By stipulation, Al and Bill have the same justification for believing that p (if Al
ever had more, he’s forgotten it), p is true in each case, and neither subject is poised
to be Gettiered. As a result, Bill dispositionally knows that p, while Al is in a
position to know that p. Still, Al and Bill are near mental duplicates. They have all
the same dispositions and occurrent mental states. Their slight difference in
dispositional mental states is ineffectual. They would act and reason identically,
even regarding p. They would have phenomenologically identical mental lives. And
so on.
Evaluation of Al and Bill, I claim, supports P1. In cases where knowing and
being in a position to know are this similar, these relations can be identical in value.
Here, we see the thought experiment that Carter et al. cite does not support the
distinctive value of knowledge. If offered to be in Bill’s current position or Al’s, I
would have no preference. There’s no reason to have one. There is a related way to
see support for P1 here. If Al’s and Bill’s current relations to p differed in value, it’s
implausible that this would ultimately be explained by something as insignificant as
which of Al and Bill previously occurrently believed that p (especially given how
Footnote 6 continued
dispositional belief, and cases where something nearly counts as dispositional belief, but we won’t be
able to tell which cases are which. The difference will be hard to detect and apparently trivial. It won’t
split the cases into groups that seem importantly different, or even relevantly different. If offered to be in
one group or the other, we’d have no preference. The difference between dispositionally knowing and
being in a position to know, then, can be hard to detect and apparently trivial, tracking no preferences.
This supports P1. Thanks to a referee for pressing me to clarify several points here.
7 See Bernecker (2008: Chap. 9), Michaelian (2011), and especially Schacter and Addis (2007).
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memory processing stores related information that wasn’t previously believed).8 We
could have nearly maximal information about Al and Bill, and then learn about their
slightly different psychological histories. But, intuitively, this unremarkable
discovery does not uncover a difference in value—not a difference that makes
the value of knowledge distinctive. It might uncover that Bill alone currently
achieves something (true belief) or succeeds with respect to p. But it is not a priori
that achievements and such are preferable or help constitute distinctively valuable
relations. Rather, it is a generalization from cases. My support for P1 undermines
the generalization, not vice versa.
Here is a second line of support for P1. Dispositional knowledge requires
dispositional belief, which requires belief simpliciter. What does belief simpliciter
require? On representationalism, the standard philosophical view about belief, S’s
having a belief that p requires S to bear a special relation to a mental representation
that p. Elsewhere (Frise, manuscript), I’ve argued that if this view is correct, then,
given the research on the cognitive psychology of memory, we have no
dispositional beliefs. We typically do not mentally represent the propositions that
are not contents of occurrent mental states, even the propositions that we have
occurrently believed. And when we do mentally represent these propositions, we
typically don’t bear the relation to them that belief requires. Given the standard view
of beliefs, the best explanation of the data is that memory doesn’t store beliefs for
later activation. Instead memory creates beliefs. Memory is generative, not
preservative.9 Given representationalism, as a contingent matter of fact all beliefs
are occurrent. So, all knowledge is too. None is dispositional.
I’ll explain how this supports P1 by explaining how something even weaker
supports P1. It doesn’t ultimately matter that it seems we lack dispositional beliefs.
What ultimately matters is that we could discover that we lack them, depending on
what we discover about our psychology and about the correct theory of belief. In
this way, we could discover that we lack dispositional knowledge. We would in this
way discover that the propositions we apparently dispositionally know are instead
ones we are in a position to know. But we would not in this way discover that there
is any less value than we had attributed. Instead, we would just discover that
dispositionally knowing isn’t the only relation with the value we had attributed.
When we attribute value to a psychological relation, empirical psychological data
and philosophical theory about that relation won’t rule out whether there is anything
with that value. They may only rule out certain psychological entities as (part of) the
actual bearers of the value. If they ruled out that we have psychological item X, then
X must not be (part of) the only potential bearer of the value we are inclined to
attribute. Theory and data could rule out that we have dispositional beliefs, thereby
ruling out that we have dispositional knowledge. This would simply reveal that
being in a position to know shares the value of dispositional knowledge. Whenever
8 Cf. Kvanvig (2003), who claims that knowledge and Gettiered belief differ only in some trivial property
that could not explain a difference in their value.
9 Cf. Frise (2015) and Michaelian (2011).
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we had thought that dispositional knowledge legitimately closes inquiry, instead
being in a position to know closes it.
If we could learn in this way that being in a position to know shares the value of
dispositional knowledge, then it in fact shares that value. Our value-attributions are
insensitive to our learning certain details about the bearer of value. Apparently the
details don’t affect the value. Whatever the details are, the value remains. Compare:
our aesthetic value-attributions to seemingly colored objects are insensitive to our
learning whether the objects are actually colored. Maybe the beautiful painting has
color, maybe (as many color scientists and philosophers tell us) it lacks color and
instead simply causes certain color experiences. Apparently these details don’t
matter. Objects with color, and non-colored objects with certain causal profiles,
share aesthetic value.
You might object to this line of support for P1 as follows. Let’s grant that, on
representationalism, we could learn that we have no dispositional beliefs and we
could, as a result, reasonably conclude that knowledge lacks distinctive value. Still,
it is better to abandon representationalism than to accept that conclusion. We should
select a theory of belief on which our having dispositional beliefs is relevantly
immune to psychological research.
However, it isn’t clearly reasonable to sacrifice a leading theory of belief just to
preserve, not knowledge’s value, but the uniqueness of its value. If knowledge lacks
distinctive value, it doesn’t follow that knowledge has less value or a lesser kind of
value than we had thought. Knowledge may just share its value with something else.
And the sacrifice isn’t clearly dialectically appropriate. If representationalism
conflicts with knowledge being distinctively valuable, then the evidence for the
former should count at least somewhat against the latter. At any rate, we will at least
have learned that the latter has a significant, previously unappreciated cost: it forces
the abandonment of the most popular theory of belief.
Most importantly, abandoning representationalism does not preserve the
distinctive value of knowledge. This is because we find similar support for P1
even if we shift to the only promising and defended alternative theory of belief. That
theory is dispositionalism: S believes that p iff S has a set of suitable dispositions
toward p. Believing, according to dispositionalism, has to do with being poised to
act and reason in certain ways and to have certain experiences. Now, for any
proposition, more than one set of dispositions suffices for believing it, and it isn’t
clear exactly what these sets are. When we attribute belief that p to a subject, we
aren’t aware of exactly which relevant set she has. For many ordinary attributions of
belief that p, we could discover that the subject lacks some disposition necessary for
having a set that’s sufficient for belief that p (regardless of whether the belief would
have been dispositional or occurrent). The same holds for knowledge-attributions,
since knowledge requires belief. For many ordinary attributions of knowledge that
p, we could discover that the subject lacks some disposition that would enable
knowledge that p. But the discovery would not thereby reveal that some associated
attribution of value is incorrect. The value could remain. So knowledge mustn’t be
the sole bearer of it. So knowledge’s value isn’t distinctive, even on
dispositionalism.
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Less abstractly: suppose I know that you are as even-keeled as an island, such that
you aren’t even disposed to feel surprise when you gain strong evidence that a belief
of yours is false. You point out to me that q: the list of names that Al and Bill read is a
list of philosophers’ names. You talk at length about the work of each named
philosopher. I attribute belief and knowledge that q to you, and also value to your
relation to q. I do so in response to your behavior and to q’s clear truth. I might be in a
position to infer reasonably from your behavior that you are disposed to affirm q, and
that you have many other dispositions concerning q. But I am not in a position to
reasonably infer just which dispositions you have that together suffice for your
believing q. Now suppose I become reasonably convinced that dispositionalism is true
and that, because you aren’t disposed to feel surprise upon gaining strong evidence
against q, you are actually one suitable disposition shy of any set sufficient for belief
that q. I learn you don’t believe q. So I learn you don’t know that q.
Still, my value-attribution wouldn’t change. I valued your relation to q even
when I knew you were even-keeled. To me, what keeps you from belief and
knowledge is just a surprising technicality, something irrelevant to my original
value-attribution. And this case is not peculiar. We are better at spotting value than
knowledge. As was true on representationalism, many ordinary knowledge-
attributions could turn out to be false due to a subtlety about our psychology and
about what belief requires. Our value-attributions are insensitive to these subtleties,
yet our value-attributions are generally true, and would be true even if these
subtleties played out differently. So the value must not depend on these subtleties.
Some things falling short of knowledge will share its value.
The support for P2 is straightforward. P2 states that knowledge is not
distinctively valuable if some dispositional knowledge shares its value with being
in a position to know. If knowledge is distinctively valuable, any mode of it is too.
The literature evaluating knowledge has never limited its object to some mode of
knowledge. And no such limit appears to have been intended.10 An ascription of any
mode of knowledge legitimately closes inquiry. Any mode of knowledge seems
preferable to true belief. And dispositional knowledge is traditionally understood to
be a mode of knowledge.11 If it is not a mode, then a kind of skepticism obtains: we
have just a fraction of the knowledge we commonsensically attribute, since at any
given time most attributed knowledge would be dispositional. Being in a position to
know is not a mode of knowledge. So, if dispositional knowledge is not distinct in
value from it, knowledge simpliciter isn’t either.
Even if there seems to be, at best, reason to suspend judgment about P1 rather
than reason to endorse it, then there is reason to suspend judgment about whether
knowledge is distinctively valuable. That is a troublesome enough result. But P1 and
P2 are plausible, so we have reason to endorse C; knowledge is not distinctively
10 Carter et al. (2013), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Pritchard (2007, 2010), and Williamson (2000), for
example, nowhere even implicate that they might have intended such a limit. And Kvanvig’s (2009:
345–6) discussion of the value of knowledge covers the occurrent/dispositional distinction for beliefs, but
doesn’t apply it to knowledge; apparently, there’s no need to use that distinction to qualify any evaluation
of knowledge.
11 See, e.g., Goldman (2011: 260), Huemer (1999), and Moser (1989: 13–23).
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valuable. The secondary value problem is illusory. Or, it’s not quite what we
thought it was. Knowledge and certain things that fall short of it have distinctive
value. But why? That’s the question to answer.
4 Occurrent knowledge depreciated
One way to mitigate the force of C is to identify a specific mode of knowledge that
could still be distinctively valuable, even if knowledge simpliciter is not. The most
promising mode is occurrent knowledge. Maybe, if offered either occurrent
knowledge or some relation falling short of it, all else being equal occurrent
knowledge is preferable. And maybe the history of epistemology has not focused on
knowledge simpliciter, but rather on occurrent knowledge. Occurrent knowledge
still might seem distinct in value from being in a position to know. When we reflect
on maximally similar subjects like Al and Bill, but where only one of them
occurrently knows that p and the other doesn’t even believe p—the other is in a
position to know that p—we find it plausible that there is a difference in value in
their relations to p. And psychology won’t reveal that we lack occurrent beliefs, so
there is no reason to think that something besides occurrent knowledge could also be
bearing the value we’ve been attributing to it.
However, for two reasons, not even occurrent knowledge is distinctively
valuable. So, C is not softened, and it seems that no mode of knowledge is
distinctively valuable. First, when a subject goes to sleep, her occurrent beliefs
become dispositional and she loses (nearly) all occurrent knowledge. But it doesn’t
seem that she loses (nearly) all specially valuable relations to propositions. Second,
it’s unclear how much we occurrently know at any given time. How much we
occurrently know depends on exactly what it takes for a belief to be occurrent rather
than dispositional, on what it takes to have a belief, and on what our psychology is
like. Settling these issues will settle whether we have around (say) twenty occurrent
beliefs at any given time, or instead around five occurrent beliefs (and fifteen
further, dispositional beliefs) then. This will settle how much we occurrently know
at a time. But it wouldn’t settle how many relations of special value there are at any
given time. We wouldn’t posit fewer relations of special value if we learned that we
had fewer occurrent beliefs, nor more relations of special value if we learned that we
had more occurrent beliefs. This suggests that occurrent knowledge shares its value
with dispositional knowledge. And if occurrent knowledge shares its value with
dispositional knowledge, then given P1, some occurrent knowledge shares it value
even with being in a position to know.
Finally, it would be a notable and illuminating concession to suppose that just
occurrent knowledge is distinctively valuable. The secondary value problem would,
again, be illusory. Knowledge simpliciter would not be distinctively valuable. Just
some mode of it would be. But why just that mode? Since the mode is occurrent, it
seems the value would have to do with the subject’s perspective. It would be worth
exploring whether this supports views of knowledge and justification that attach
special significance to the subject’s perspective, views like evidentialism and
internalism.
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5 Conclusion
Whether one dispositionally knows that p or is instead in a position to know that
p can ultimately depend on minor biographical details that would poorly account for
the alleged distinctive value of knowledge. And our knowledge-attributions, but not
our value-attributions, are hostage to what we learn about the nature of belief,
dispositional belief, and our psychology. So, I’ve argued, knowledge is not
distinctively valuable. And it seems that not even occurrent knowledge is
distinctively valuable, since in many ordinary cases dispositional and occurrent
knowledge share value.
Of course, one could weaken my support for P1 by forfeiting the traditional view
that knowledge requires belief, a view accepted even by anti-traditionalists about
knowledge like Williamson (2000). If knowledge doesn’t require belief, then it may
be no surprise that Al and Bill seem to have equally valuable relations to p. For it
could be that both currently know that p, even though Al does not believe that
p. And if knowledge doesn’t require belief, then our knowledge-attributions aren’t
hostage to the relevant discoveries about belief and our psychology. However, this
forfeiture would itself set a steep price on the distinctive value of knowledge. And it
would have to be shown that the forfeiture is independently motivated, not simply
ad hoc. It may have the odd consequence that being in a position to know can in fact
be a kind of knowing. After all, what had distinguished these relations was simply
that traditional belief-requirement on knowledge.
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